WSJ - Money Laundering (fwd)

Justin J. Lister (ruf@osiris.cs.uow.edu.au)
Tue, 19 Sep 1995 01:12:19 +1000 (EST)

   The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 1995, p. B2.

   Software May Dry Up Money Laundering

   By Margaret A. Jacobs

   Can artificial intelligence be used to combat crime by
   ferreting out money laundering?

   Officials at law enforcement, defense and intelligence
   agencies like to think so. They have suggested creating a
   sophisticated computer program to screen records of the
   more than 700,000 electronic money transfers involving U.S.
   institutions each day and to flag suspicious ones for
   further investigation. By using so-called artificial
   intelligence, they hope to stop some of the $300 billion in
   profits from drug deals and other illegal activities that
   they estimate is laundered through financial institutions
   world-wide each year.

   But in a report issued yesterday, the congressional Office
   of Technology Assessment says any such plan would face
   considerable obstacles. Federal privacy laws generally
   prevent banks and other financial institutions from sharing
   with the government much of the information they have about
   electronic money transfers, unless the government issues a
   subpoena or obtains a search warrant, the report notes. The
   report also cites technological limitations,, including the
   difficulty of developing a profile of suspicious activity
   that a computer could search for, and the high cost of such
   a program, among other things.

   Though Congress has yet to consider proposals to use
   artificial intelligence to fight money laundering, the
   Senate Government Affairs Committee -- at the urging of
   defense contractor Mitre Corp. of Reston, Va., which has
   expressed interest in supplying such a system -- had
   requested that the OTA convene a panel of experts to study
   the matter. The OTA advises Congress on technology issues,
   but isn't expected to receive funding in the next fiscal
   year.

   Banks and other financial institutions are now required to
   report to the government only cash deposits exceeding
   $10,000. The institutions aren't required to report
   electronic transfers, even though the OTA estimates that
   the vast majority of money is laundered that way. Such
   transactions typically involve dozens of transfers made
   through banks in various countries, often in the names of
   shell corporations, with the intent not to leave a trail.
   An estimated one-tenth of one percent of all electronic
   transfers involve funds being laundered.

   By next spring, however, U.S. banks will be required by
   Treasury Department regulations to retain more-detailed
   records of each electronic transfer, including the identity
   of the sender, and to report to the government suspicious
   electronic transfers that come to their attention.

   Artificial intelligence is "clearly where we have to be
   headed," says Stanley E. Morris, director of the Financial
   Crimes Enforcement Network, a Treasury Department agency
   that oversees anti-money-laundering efforts.

   But the OTA notes that giving the government access to the
   records of individuals is impossible under current law,
   unless the government issues a subpoena or obtains a search
   warrant, much like it must do to tap telephones. To obtain
   a search warrant and to enforce a contested subpoena in
   court, the government has to convince a judge or magistrate
   that there is a likelihood of criminal activity.

   While the law doesn't give corporations as much protection,
   most banks don't turn over corporate money-transfer records
   without a subpoena or search warrant.

   The OTA also notes that banks fear that allowing law
   enforcement unrestricted access to electronic-transfer data
   would make businesses in Europe and other industrialized
   nations reluctant to use U.S. financial institutions. The
   U.S. would "run the risk of the flight of legitimate
   capital" from domestic banks, the OTA concludes.

   "For any artificial-intelligence system to work we also
   would need the same level of surveillance," carried by
   other countries, says Joel Reidenberg, a law professor at
   Fordham Law School and a privacy expert who advised OTA on
   the report. "Most other countries generally have more, not
   less privacy protections than we do," he adds, noting that
   such protections are being strengthened in Europe.

   Businesses are also concerned that if the government
   requires financial institutions to retain more data on
   electronic money transfers, the information will be
   exploited by banks or revealed through litigation, possibly
   giving competitors a look at their corporate planning,
   stock strategies and vendor relationships.

   "Once banks have this vast amount of information, there
   will be tremendous pressure on them to use it," says Prof.
   Reidenberg. A system without strict safeguards against
   unauthorized disclosure would create a "surveillance state
   that a democratic society just won't accept," he adds.

   But even if privacy concerns could be overcome, the OTA and
   electronic moneytransfer experts say it isn't likely that
   the technology could deliver.

   One big problem is deciding what types of transactions are
   suspicious -- a key step in developing a computer-screening
   system, says John Byrne, senior federal counsel with the
   American Bankers Association. For example, the OTA notes
   that a computer might look for five $3,000 transfers in a
   single day on the assumption that the intent was to evade
   cash-reporting requirements.

   But without a more sophisticated profile, such a search
   would target many legitimate transfers for investigation,
   broadly intruding into the privacy of innocent companies
   and individuals, according to the OTA and privacy experts.

   The OTA recommends that the government more aggressively
   use subpoenas and search warrants to expand its knowledge
   of the way money launderers use electronic transfers before
   embarking on anything more than a limited artificial-
   intelligence project, among other things.

   Meanwhile, some big banks are understood to be
   experimenting with artificial intelligence on their own.
   Systems used internally at banks aren't likely to raise
   privacy concerns and may help fulfill federal requirements
   to report suspicious activity to the authorities, as well
   as reduce losses related to money laundering.

   Last year, American Express Bank International, an American
   Express Co. subsidiary, agreed to pay a $7 million fine as
   part of a settlement with the Justice Department of a civil
   money-laundering case. The department contended that the
   bank failed to cooperate in the criminal prosecution of two
   former employees who were convicted of aiding a Mexican
   drug dealer in laundering about $30 million.

   [End]

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|  ____       ___     | Justin Lister                 ruf@cs.uow.edu.au  |
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