IDS versus keystroke monitoring
Richard A Childers (pascal@netcom.com)
Mon, 19 Sep 1994 16:42:00 -0700
> How does one design an intruder detection system so that it can not be
> used to spy upon one's employees or fellow workers ?
"How does one build a weapon that only kills enemies and never kills
friendlies?"
Hmmm. By requiring multiple people to operate it, concertedly, as is done
with nuclear weapons systems ?
Not an entirely bad idea, now that I think of it. If security is impor-
-tant enough to monitor it in the first place, perhaps it would also be
appropriate to take steps to make sure that the security data ( which is
as sensitive as the data the security is intended to protect ) is itself
well-protected from misuse.
Conventionally, this is done by distributing the power, along with the
corresponding responsibility.
Perhaps a special-purpose workstation with three special keys required to
unlock and operate it ... each key, unreplicatable by conventional means ?
( I haven't had much faith in magnetic cards since I watched a BART card
get copied by two read/write heads, intervening circuitry, and a 9-volt
battery. [ BART == Bay Area Rapid Transit ] )
Such a workstation is an intriguing thought. ( And a great opportunity for
a vendor to add some lasting value, IMHO. )
Here's hoping public policy shifts in this direction ... < clink >
-- richard
Law : The science of assigning responsibility.
Politics : The art of _distributing_ responsibility.
richard childers san francisco, california pascal@netcom.com